David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Thinking and Reasoning 16 (2):131-155 (2011)
In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the task, then a likely conclusion can be inferred based only on background assumptions. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning is that the selection of these additional assumptions is constrained by actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast, in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions, unconstrained by actual events. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers from counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention of reading a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, “If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?” should counterfactually be answered “in the park”. But by ignoring the doctor's intentions, and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital doctor who has not been called out to an emergency, one might answer: “in the hospital”. Only by 6 years of age did children mostly give correct answers
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Kushnir, Alison Gopnik, Nadia Chernyak, Elizabeth Seiver & Henry M. Wellman (2015). Developing Intuitions About Free Will Between Ages Four and Six. Cognition 138:79-101.
Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.
Similar books and articles
Sieghard Beller & Gregory Kuhnm (2007). What Causal Conditional Reasoning Tells Us About People's Understanding of Causality. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):426 – 460.
Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
B. D. Katz & D. Olin (2010). Conditionals, Probabilities, and Utilities: More on Two Envelopes. Mind 119 (473):171-183.
Gabriele Contessa (2006). On the Supposed Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence; Or: It Wouldn't Have Taken a Miracle! Dialectica 60 (4):461–473.
Henry Markovits (2000). A Mental Model Analysis of Young Children's Conditional Reasoning with Meaningful Premises. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):335 – 347.
Sarah L. Gorniak, Kevin J. Riggs & Sarah R. Beck (2011). Relating Developments in Children's Counterfactual Thinking and Executive Functions. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):337-354.
James Woodward (2011). Psychological Studies of Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning. In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 16.
Alan Hájek (2002). Counterfactual Reasoning (Philosophical Aspects)—Quantitative. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier. pp. 2872-2874.
Added to index2010-07-27
Total downloads45 ( #107,825 of 1,924,752 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #61,867 of 1,924,752 )
How can I increase my downloads?