In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press. pp. 231 (2004)
…those who accept that responsibility for a situation implies an ability to bring it about and, perhaps, an ability to prevent it, must explain how agents are able to do other than they are caused to do. Without it, they can give no defense of their counterexamples. With it, they can be confident that.
|Keywords||Ability Action Compatibilism|
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My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - Journal of Ethics 12 (2):167-189.
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