Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter

London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan (2014)
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Abstract

In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.

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Citations of this work

World and Logic.Jens Lemanski - 2021 - London, Vereinigtes Königreich: College Publications.
Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.

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