Kant on Concept and Intuition
Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles (
1985)
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Abstract
This dissertation is an interpretation of Kant's theory of mental representation, and an attempt to elucidate this theory by viewing it from both historical and contemporary perspectives. After an exposition of Kant's notions of intuition, sensation, and concept, I argue that the theory as a whole can be seen as an Aristotelian reaction against Leibnizian rationalism and Humean empiricism and naturalism. As in Aristotelian theories, Kant argues that there are two distinct types of mental representation, and two distinct types of processes involved in cognition. ;I construe the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy as a series of arguments against Hume for the thesis that our mental repertoire contains conceptual as well as passively received representations. The division of the anti-Humean arguments I find to be most fruitful is the division into arguments from above and arguments from below. I find it illuminating to view several aspects of Kant's anti-Humean arguments from the perspective of contemporary concerns in the theory of intentionality. Some of Kant's contentions against Hume can be seen as an attempt to resist a tendency to redescribe intentional relations so that the resulting description is extensional. Kant can be viewed as trying to preserve the idea that sentences describing intentional relations from the perspective of the subject are irreducibly intensional. ;I argue that the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled 'The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' together with portions of a later work, On a Discovery, contain an argument against Leibniz or the Leibnizians of Kant's day for the thesis that nonconceptual elements, as well as concepts, are required for the cognition of physical objects. Questions arise here about the relation between Kant's views on this issue and modern studies of indexicality. My view is that Kant can be construed as providing a theory about what underlies the irreducibly indexical element in our cognitions of physical objects. Kant's idea of passive receptivity, closely tied to the notion of what the experience of a quality is like, is relevant to this, as is the notion of an external or relational quality developed in the Amphiboly