The Monist 49 (2):234-247 (1965)

The aim of this article is to provide a way of resolving the apparent dilemma between our requirement as agents that actions should be free and our demand as spectators that all events should be predictable and explicable on the basis of antecedent conditions. I hope to show that what has often been incorrectly regarded as a logical incompatibility between freedom and determinism is, in fact, a disparity but not an over-all contradiction between the viewpoint of an agent and that of a spectator. While it is logically impossible for a person to deliberate about his conduct in a given matter from the standpoint of an agent and also predict it as a spectator, this is the only logical incompatibility between these positions, and it does not preclude the two points of view from being equally legitimate ways of viewing action. Perhaps it has sometimes been a vague recognition of the fact that one logically cannot both deliberate upon and predict one’s own conduct in a certain matter that has led some philosophers to conclude erroneously that choice on the part of an agent is inconsistent with prediction or explanation of his decision on the part of any spectator. This unwarranted conclusion is equivalent to denying that conduct can be regarded both from the standpoint of the agent and that of the spectator.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist196549216
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Action, Causality, and Teleology.Ruth Macklin - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4):301-316.

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