Theoria 69 (3):211-232 (2003)

Anthony F. Peressini
Marquette University
With respect to the confirmation of mathematical propositions, proof possesses an epistemological authority unmatched by other means of confirmation. This paper is an investigation into why this is the case. I make use of an analysis drawn from an early reliability perspective on knowledge to help make sense of mathematical proofs singular epistemological status.
Keywords proof  mathematical proof  reliability  mathematical knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2003.tb00763.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,398
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Statistical Data and Mathematical Propositions.Cory Juhl - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):100-115.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
50 ( #202,956 of 2,420,551 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,979 of 2,420,551 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes