The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism

Philosophical Studies (1):1-11 (2012)
Abstract
The question I raise is whether Mark Balaguer’s event-causal libertarianism can withstand the disappearing agent objection. The concern is that with the causal role of the events antecedent to a decision already given, nothing settles whether the decision occurs, and so the agent does not settle whether the decision occurs. Thus it would seem that in this view the agent will not have the control in making decisions required for moral responsibility. I examine whether Balaguer’s position has the resources to answer this objection
Keywords Event-causal libertarianism  Non-causal libertarianism  Disappearing agent objection  Indeterminism  Moral responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9899-2
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David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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