There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience

Synthese:1-30 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I then develop a holistic conception of SIL for entities and argue that it has at least equal pre-empirical warrant, is more conservative philosophically in that it decides less from the a priori “armchair,” and enjoys a fruitful two-way relationship with empirical work.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Chalmers’ fading and dancing qualla.Liam Dempsey - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
Qualism.Todd Clayton Hughes - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Attentional Organization and the Unity of Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):56-87.
The problem of artificial qualia.Wael Basille - 2021 - Dissertation, Sorbonne Université
Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of Consciousness.Jacy Reese Anthis - 2022 - In Valentin Klimov & David Kelley (eds.), Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 2021. Springer International Publishing. pp. 20-41.
A Deweyan Assessment of Three Major Tendencies in Philosophy of Consciousness.Marco Stango - 2017 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (3):466.
Faster than Thought.Thomas Metzinger - 1995 - In Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
The neurophilosophy of subjectivity.Pete Mandik - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-05-13

Downloads
128 (#146,393)

6 months
25 (#118,899)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anthony F. Peressini
Marquette University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

View all 84 references / Add more references