Authors
Pietro Perconti
Università degli Studi di Messina
Abstract
: According to Tim Crane, his version of psychologism is not based on the familiar opposition between conceptual analysis and empirical science. His point is not simply to consider phenomenological and empirical data in the science of the mind. Challenging the idea that investigation of the mind has to be understood “as an autonomous investigation solely into the concepts embodied in our psychological discourse”, Crane tries to argue for a more realistic picture of the mental. His rejection of “autonomous investigation”, however, is based in the end on its impermeability to empirical evidence and on the consequent reduction of philosophy of mind to conceptual analysis of ordinary intentional vocabulary. This seems clear as far as conceptual analysis goes, but perhaps has some undesired consequences in terms of common sense vocabulary. In fact, with respect to folk psychological discourse about the mind, all that Crane is saying is that — besides conceptual analysis — we have to take into consideration empirical evidence in order to reconsider common sense discourse on the mind. This is not so different from the familiar contrast between conceptual analysis and empirical science. Keywords : Psychologism; -psycholosigm; Conceptual Analysis; Common Sense Knowledge; Folk-psychology La psicologizzazzione dello psicologico e il ritorno al senso comune Riassunto : Secondo Tim Crane, la sua idea di psicologismo non poggia sulla nota opposizione tra analisi concettuale e scienza empirica. Non si tratta semplicemente di tenere in considerazione i dati empirici e fenomenici all’interno della scienza della mente. Diversamente da quanti ritengono che l’indagine sulla mente debba essere intesa “come un’indagine autonoma che verte solo sui concetti incorporati nel nostro discorso psicologico”, Crane vorrebbe sostenere un’immagine più realistica del mentale. Il rifiuto del metodo della “indagine autonoma”, poggia in definitiva sull’impermeabilità all’evidenza empirica e sulla conseguente riduzione della filosofia della mente ad analisi concettuale del lessico intenzionale ordinario. Quanto pare chiaro circa l’analisi concettuale, ha forse tuttavia qualche conseguenza indesiderata sul lessico del senso comune. In effetti, se prendiamo in considerazione il discorso della psicologia del senso comune sulla mente, quanto Crane afferma è che – oltre l’analisi concettuale – dovremmo tener conto anche dell’evidenza empirica. Questo, tuttavia, non sembra tanto lontano dalla solita contrapposizione tra analisi concettuale e scienza empirica. Parole chiave : Psicologismo; -psicologismo; Analisi concettuale; Conoscenza di senso comune; Psicologia del senso comune.
Keywords Conceptual Analysis  -psycholosigm  Psychologism  Common Sense Knowledge  Folk-psychology
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DOI 10.4453/rifp.2016.0012
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