Inferentialism is the conviction that to be meaningful in the distinctively human way, or to have a 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The term was coined by Robert Brandom as a label for his theory of language; however, it is also naturally applicable (and is growing increasingly common) within the philosophy of logic
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

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On the Meaning of Causal Generalisations in Policy-Oriented Economic Research.François Claveau & Luis Mireles-Flores - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (4):397-416.

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