Forging Model/World Relations: Relevance and Reliability

Philosophy of Science 79 (5):749-760 (2012)
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The relation between models and the world is mediated by experimental procedures generating data that are used as evidence to evaluate the model. Data can serve as empirical evidence, for or against, only if they result from reliable experimental procedures. The aim of this article is to discuss the role of relevance judgments in the evaluation of reliability and to clarify the conditions under which reliability can be a strictly empirical matter. It is argued that reliability is a strictly empirical issue only in the restricted case in which the claim under test/investigation is about a data-generating procedure.



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Isabelle Peschard
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

A role for spatiotemporal scales in modeling.Marina Baldissera Pacchetti - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 67:14-21.
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References found in this work

Introduction: The Pluralist Stance.Stephen H. Kellert, Helen Longino & C. Kenneth Waters - 2006 - In Stephen H. Kellert, Helen Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (eds.), Scientific Pluralism. University of Minnesota Press.
On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?Phyllis Rooney - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:13-22.
Where have all the theories gone?Margaret Morrison - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):195-228.

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