Heat, Temperature and Phenomenal Concepts

In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 155 (2008)
Abstract
The reduction of the concept of heat to that of molecular kinetic energy is recurrently presented as lending analogical support to the project of reduction of phenomenal concepts to physical concepts. The claimed analogy draws on the way the use of the concept of heat is attached to the experience in first person of a certain sensation. The reduction of this concept seems to prove the possibility to reduce discourse involving phenomenal concepts to a scientific description of neural activity. But is this analogy really justified? We will show that if there is an analogy, far from speaking for a reduction of phenomenal concepts, it rather stresses the necessity to integrate phenomenal reports in the scientific study of experience.
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The Quantum Structure of Knowledge.Michel Bitbol - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (2):357-371.

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