Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Oxford University Press UK (2016)
Authors
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Abstract
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology
Keywords accuracy  credence  scoring rules  accuracy-first epistemology  rationality  formal epistemology  Probabilism  Bayesian epistemology  Principal Principle  Principle of Indifference
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Reprint years 2018
ISBN(s) 9780198732716   9780198822462
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Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.
Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.
Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.

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