Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x19002346
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References found in this work BETA

Naturalizing Tomasello’s History of Morality.Philip Pettit - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):722-735.

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Helping Others in Interaction.Alessandro Salice & Glenda Satne - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (4):608-627.

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