Conceptualism and truth

Ratio 13 (3):234–238 (2000)
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Abstract

Truth implies mind because falsity does and the same analysis must be given of each. Some philosophers (Aristotle, Brentano) express this by saying that ‘true’ and ‘false’ apply strictly speaking to judgments and derivatively to everything else. A consequence of this is that all non‐judgmental senses of ‘true’ and ‘false’ include some relation to a judgment. But counterexamples to this occur. So an alternative assay must be sought which both covers all cases and retains the idea that truth is mind‐dependent. Under this correction, something is true if and only if it conforms to an ideal standard or measure. This broader view of truth is compatible with realism and conceptualism but not with nominalism. If there are independent reasons for rejecting realism, it follows that conceptualism is true and universals exist only in minds.

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