Conventionalism, scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge

Abstract In this paper the basic aim of the so?called ?strong programme? in the sociology of knowledge is examined. The ?strong programme? is considered (and rightly so) as an extreme version of the anti?realist view of science. While the problem of scientific realism has normally been dealt with from the point of view of the ?context of justification? of theories, the paper focuses on the issues raised by law?discovery. In this context Herbert Simon's views about the existence of a ?logic of scientific discovery? are discussed and criticized. The main thesis of the paper is that if the structure of both discovery and prediction is properly understood, then the basic anti?realist claims become untenable. A fortiori, the ?strong programme? appears to be unable to explain some basic features of the structure of science
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DOI 10.1080/02698599308573467
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References found in this work BETA
Norwood Russell Hanson (1960). Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):91 – 106.

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