Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998)
If an agent is to be moved to action, then two requirements have to be fulfilled: first, the agent must possess beliefs about the way things actually are, about the actions possible given the way things are, and about the likely effects of those actions on how things are; and, second, the agent must have or form desires to change the way things are by resorting to this or that course of action. The beliefs tell the agent about how things are and about how they can be altered; the desires attract the agent to how things are not but can be made to be.
|Keywords||desire direction of fit|
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Moral Psychology and Expressivism.Robert Dunn - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):178–198.
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