Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299 (2001)

Authors
Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Abstract
Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed this issue, and this is a problem. The discursive dilemma of my title--a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox from analytical jurisprudence--shows that the procedures distinguished can come apart. Thus deliberative democrats must make up their minds on where they stand in relation to the issue; they cannot sit on the fence. This paper is an attempt to address the issue and look at the grounds on which it may be resolved.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1758-2237.2001.tb00047.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Democracy and Disagreement.Amy Gutmann - 1996 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Delibration and Democratic Legitimacy.Joshua Cohen - 1989 - In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Routledge, in Association with the Open University.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 102 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Communicative Democracy: A Version of Deliberative Democracy.Adela Cortina - 2010 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 96 (2):133-150.
The Deliberative Democrat’s Idea of Justice.John S. Dryzek - 2013 - European Journal of Political Theory 12 (4):329-346.
E-Democracy, E-Contestation and the Monitorial Citizen.Jeroen van den Hoven - 2005 - Ethics and Information Technology 7 (2):51-59.
Can Deliberative Democracy Be Partisan?Russell Muirhead - 2010 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 22 (2-3):129-157.
The (Severe) Limits of Deliberative Democracy as the Basis for Political Choice.Gerald F. Gaus - 2008 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 55 (117):26-53.
Depoliticizing Democracy.Philip Pettit - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (1):52-65.
Pictures of Politics: Deliberative and Other Aspects of Democracy.Bert van den Brink - 2012 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 98 (3):396-410.
Liberal, Republican and Deliberative Democracy.Henning Ottmann - 2006 - Synthesis Philosophica 21 (2):315-325.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-04

Total views
316 ( #28,737 of 2,448,391 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #19,547 of 2,448,391 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes