Deference Done Right

Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19 (2014)
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Abstract

There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds of epistemic experts mentioned above. Of the three deference principles we consider, we argue that two of the options face insuperable difficulties. The third, on the other hand, fares well|at least when it is applied in a particular way

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Author Profiles

Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University

Citations of this work

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.

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