Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19 (2014)

Authors
Michael Titelbaum
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Abstract
There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds of epistemic experts mentioned above. Of the three deference principles we consider, we argue that two of the options face insuperable difficulties. The third, on the other hand, fares well|at least when it is applied in a particular way
Keywords Bayesianism  Epistemic deference  Expert principles  Principal Principle  New Principle  Reflection Principle  New Reflection Principle
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.

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