Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):329-353 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy. Key Words: legitimacy • deliberative democracy • epistemic democracy • social epistemology.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
2,053 (#4,499)

6 months
173 (#18,709)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fabienne Peter
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):286-306.
Pure Epistemic Proceduralism.Fabienne Peter - 2008 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1):33-55.
Justice, Disagreement, and Democracy.Laura Valentini - 2012 - British Journal of Political Science 43 (1):177-99.
The Epistemic Value of Testimony.Matthew Chick - 2022 - Contemporary Political Theory 21 (1):93-113.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations