Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):329-353 (2007)

Authors
Fabienne Peter
University of Warwick
Abstract
A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy. Key Words: legitimacy • deliberative democracy • epistemic democracy • social epistemology.
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DOI 10.1177/1470594X07081303
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References found in this work BETA

The Fate of Knowledge.Helen Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Inclusion and Democracy.Iris Marion Young - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Pure Epistemic Proceduralism.Fabienne Peter - 2008 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1):33-55.
Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):286-306.
What is Democratic Reliability? Epistemic Theories of Democracy and the Problem of Reasonable Disagreement.Felix Gerlsbeck - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2):218-241.
Pragmatism, Inquiry and Political Liberalism.Matthew Festenstein - 2010 - Contemporary Political Theory 9 (1):25-44.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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Democratic Legitimacy Without Collective Rationality.Fabienne Peter - 2009 - In Boudewijn Paul de Bruin & Christopher F. Zurn (eds.), New Waves in Political Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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Contestation and Deliberation Within.Joshua W. Houston - 2009 - Social Philosophy Today 25:241-253.
Equality and Legitimacy.Wojciech Sadurski - 2008 - Oxford University Press.

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