Descriptivism, rigidified and anchored

Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):323-338 (2004)
Abstract
Stalnaker argues that, while the two-dimensional framework can be used to give expression to the claims associated with rigidified descriptivism, it cannot be used to support that position. He also puts forward some objections to rigidified descriptivism. I agree that rigidified descriptivism cannot be supported by appeal to the two-dimensional framework. But I think that Stalnaker’s objections can be avoided under a descriptivism that introduces a causal as well as a descriptive element – a descriptivism in which the relevant descriptions are allowed to be, not only rigidified, but anchored in causal exposure to referents
Keywords Descriptivism  Dimension  Logic  Rigid  Semantics  Stalnaker, R
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019551.74826.f0
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Lewis on Intentionality.Robert Stalnaker - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199 – 212.
Recent Defenses of Descriptivism.Anthony Everett - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):103–139.
The Epistemological Argument Against Descriptivism.Robin Jeshion - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):325 - 345.
Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78.
Millian Descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
Rigidification and Attitudes.Bryan Pickel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):43-58.
Against Causal Descriptivism.Panu Raatikainen - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):78-84.
Masters of Our Meanings.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
127 ( #39,259 of 2,193,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #95,890 of 2,193,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature