Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences

Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908 (2013)

Authors
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Abstract
Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifying an epistemic utility function and a decision-theoretic norm; we then show that the decision-theoretic norm applied to the epistemic utility function yields the norm for credences that we wish to justify. We survey results already obtained using this strategy, and we suggest directions for future research
Keywords probability   bayesianism   toread   Pettigrew
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12079
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References found in this work BETA

A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology.D. M. Armstrong & David Lewis - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):77.

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Citations of this work BETA

Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2017 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.

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