Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105 (2006)

Authors
Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must “supervene” on the group members’ contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’ individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be “setwise,” not “proposition-wise.” Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members’ corresponding individual judgments
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2005, 2006
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00032.x
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References found in this work BETA

Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.

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Citations of this work BETA

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.
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Joint Actions and Group Agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
Distributive and Relational Equality.Christian Schemmel - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):123-148.

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