Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2609-2629 (2018)

Jared Peterson
State University of New York at Oswego
This paper develops a novel defense of the non-sensory phenomenology of desires, and more broadly, of attitudes. I argue that the way to defend this type of phenomenology is to: offer a defense of the view that attitudes are states that realize the causal role of attitude types and argue that what realizes the causal role of attitudes are, in certain cases, states that possess non-sensory phenomenology. I carry out this approach with respect to desires by developing the view that desires play the causal role of motivating action, and in some cases, the states that play this role are states that possess the non-sensory phenomenology of attraction. I proceed to argue that if this way of defending the non-sensory phenomenology of desires, and more broadly, of attitudes, is unsuccessful, we should be eliminativists about this type of phenomenology.
Keywords Cognitive Phenomenology  Desire  Attitudes  Role Functionalism  Realizer Functionalism  Motivating Reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0974-6
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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A Puzzle About Desire.Jared Peterson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3655-3676.

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