How to defend the phenomenology of attitudes

Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2609-2629 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper develops a novel defense of the non-sensory phenomenology of desires, and more broadly, of attitudes. I argue that the way to defend this type of phenomenology is to: offer a defense of the view that attitudes are states that realize the causal role of attitude types and argue that what realizes the causal role of attitudes are, in certain cases, states that possess non-sensory phenomenology. I carry out this approach with respect to desires by developing the view that desires play the causal role of motivating action, and in some cases, the states that play this role are states that possess the non-sensory phenomenology of attraction. I proceed to argue that if this way of defending the non-sensory phenomenology of desires, and more broadly, of attitudes, is unsuccessful, we should be eliminativists about this type of phenomenology.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,898

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sensory phenomenology and perceptual content.Boyd Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Sørenarnow H. Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
Thinking with Sensations.Boyd Millar - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):134-154.
The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.
Perception and cognitive phenomenology.Michelle Montague - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2045-2062.
Intellectual Gestalts.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 174.
Without pretense: a critique of Goldman’s model of simulation.Uku Tooming - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):561-575.
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.
The Propositional Attitudes.John Heil - 1996 - ProtoSociology 8:53-67.


Added to PP

39 (#312,684)

6 months
1 (#479,521)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jared Peterson
State University of New York at Oswego

Citations of this work

A puzzle about desire.Jared Peterson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3655-3676.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

View all 52 references / Add more references