III—Normative Facts and Reasons

Fabienne Peter
University of Warwick
The main aim of this paper is to identify a type of fact-given warrant for action that is distinct from reason-based justification for action and defend the view that there are two types of practical warrant. The idea that there are two types of warrant is familiar in epistemology, but has not received much attention in debates on practical normativity. On the view that I will defend, normative facts, qua facts, give rise to entitlement warrant for action. But they do not, qua facts, give rise to reason-based warrant. Normative practical reasons, I will argue, are true propositions that represent fact-based favouring and that are made true by normative facts.
Keywords normative facts  normative practical reasons  meta-ethics  practical normativity
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DOI 10.1093/arisoc/aoz002
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Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Mind 106 (424):791-794.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.

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