Intellectual Humility without Open-mindedness: How to Respond to Extremist Views

Episteme (forthcoming)
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Abstract

How should we respond to extremist views that we know are false? This paper proposes that we should be intellectually humble, but not open-minded. We should own our intellectual limitations, but be unwilling to revise our beliefs in the falsity of the extremist views. The opening section makes a case for distinguishing the concept of intellectual humility from the concept of open-mindedness, arguing that open-mindedness requires both a willingness to revise extant beliefs and other-oriented engagement, whereas intellectual humility requires neither. Building on virtue-consequentialism, the second section makes a start on arguing that intellectually virtuous people of a particular sort—people with ‘effects-virtues’—would be intellectually humble, but not open-minded, in responding to extremist views they knew were false. We suggest that while intellectual humility and open-mindedness often travel together, this is a place where they come apart.

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Author Profiles

Cody Turner
University of Massachusetts, Boston
Heather Battaly
University of Connecticut
Katie Peters
University of Connecticut

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Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.
Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology.Robert C. Roberts & W. Jay Wood - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by W. Jay Wood.

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