Less for Recidivists? Why retributivists have a reason to punish repeat offenders less harshly than first-time offenders ∗

In Jesper Ryberg Claudio Tamburrini (ed.), Recidivists Punishment: The Philosophers' view. Lextington books (2012)
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Abstract

About 80 % of all convicted have had a prior record of conviction. But how should the state punish repeat offenders (with a prior conviction) as compared with first-time offenders who are convicted? The law in all jurisdictions, a large swathe of public opinion, and the general trend within criminal justice ethics all seem to accept what we may call: Asymmetry A The punishment of repeat offenders should be harsher than the punishment of first-time offenders. This asymmetry is obviously just a rough structure. It leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Several retributivists have argued for progressive loss of mitigation (PLM). On this view, a first-time offender receives a discount on punishment that is gradually lost if he re-offends. When the discount is lost the offender receives the full punishment, and re-offending from that point on will be punished equally. However, recently some retributivists have argued in favour of a cumulative principle (CP) according to which an offender will progressively be punished more severely the more convictions he has accumulated. In sum, in the theoretical literature on the subject, Asymmetry A has been the mantra for several prominent retributivists. The aim of this paper is to point to an all but overlooked logical point in the discussion of punishment and recidivism. This is the point that it follows, from retributivism, that there is a reason - at least in some situations, as we shall see - to support what we may call: Asymmetry B The punishment of repeat offenders should be more lenient than the punishment of first-time offenders.

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Thomas Søbirk Petersen
Roskilde University

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