Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6 (2019)
AbstractWe often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising has increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular group in question? According to the credal judgement aggregation principle, linear pooling, the credence function of a group should be a weighted average or linear pool of the credence functions of the individuals in the group. In this chapter, I give an argument for linear pooling based on considerations of accuracy. And I respond to two standard objections to the aggregation principle.
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References found in this work
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Citations of this work
On the Pragmatic and Epistemic Virtues of Inference to the Best Explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.
Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604.
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.
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