Mind 102 (405):53-79 (1993)

Authors
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Abstract
Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns of theoretical reason; the failures may not have exact theoretical analogues, exact analogues in the breakdown of belief, but they are of essentially the same, cognitive kind. Our approach gives us quite a different view of things. The pathologies which we identify in our taxonomy are distinctively rational failures and distinctively practical failures; they are failures of pure practical reason.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/102.405.53
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
The Humean Theory of Motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.

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Citations of this work BETA

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A Liberal Account of Addiction.Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):1-22.
The Structure of Orthonomy.Michael Smith - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.
Frog and Toad Lose Control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.

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