Restrictive consequentialism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):438 – 455 (1986)
Abstract
paper offers both explication and defence. Standard consequentialism is a theory of decision. It attempts to identify, for any set of alternative options, that which it is right that an agent should..
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DOI 10.1080/00048408612342631
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