Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement

In Eliot Michaelson & Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying and Insincerity. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-112 (2018)
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Abstract

According to the Acceptance Principle, a person is entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true (asserted) and that is intelligible to him or her, unless there are stronger reasons not to. Burge assumes this Principle and then argues that it has an apriori justification, basis or rationale. This paper expounds Burge's teleological reliability framework and the details of his a priori justification for the Principle. It then raises three significant doubts.

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Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside

References found in this work

Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Perceptual entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
Intention and convention in speech acts.Peter F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.

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