NY: Clarendon Press (1986)

Authors
Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Abstract
Are mental states "in the head"? Or do they intrinsically involve aspects of the subject's physical and social context? This volume presents a number of essays dealing with the compass of the mind. The contributors broach a range of issues with a commmon view that physical and social magnets do act upon mental states. The approaches that run through these papers make the volume challenging to cognitive psychologists, theorists of artificial intelligence, social theorists, and philosophers.
Keywords Cognitive Science  Mental States  Metaphysics  Minds  Social Psychology  Thought
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ISBN(s) 0198249446   0198247362   9780198249443
DOI 10.2307/2026885
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
Perception and Content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.

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