Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135 (1996)

Abstract
Distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and true belief that is knowledge implies scepticism as regards facts. That is because it falsely reduces knowledge to mere true belief To remove the scepticism, it might be held that sense and referent are the same in both. But this over-correction makes the opposite mistake of reducing mere true belief to knowledge. It also implies either assimilating false belief to true belief or saying, counterintuitively, that the sense of a belief varies with the truth-value of the belief The way out is to take the middle path of distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and identifying sense and referent in true belief that is knowledge
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps1996/97526
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