Oxford University Press (1993)
What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this novel study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It holds by the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects--this holistic individualism--it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. Within this framework, social theory is allowed to follow any of a number of paths: space is found for intentional interpretation and decision-theoretic reconstruction, for structural explanation and rational choice derivation. But political theory is treated less ecumenically. The framework raises serious questions about contractarian and atomistic modes of thought and it points the way to a republican rethinking of liberal commitments
|Keywords||Intentionality (Philosophy Intentionality (Philosophy Social aspects Social psychology Philosophy Political science Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$9.07 used (89% off) $41.56 new (47% off) $61.91 direct from Amazon (21% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.I56.P48 1996|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference.Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenicalism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):1--21.
Similar books and articles
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science.J. Krause - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.
Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-255.
Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.) - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization.John R. Searle - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality, Pluralism, and Redescription.Lee McIntyre - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505.
African Social & Political Philosophy: Selected Essays.Chukwudum Barnabas Okolo - 1993 - Fulladu Pub. Co..
There is No Escape From Philosophy: Collective Intentionality and Empirical Social Science.Antti Saaristo - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads85 ( #61,309 of 2,170,016 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #43,042 of 2,170,016 )
How can I increase my downloads?