Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95 (2006)

Authors
Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. I show that her argument begs important questions. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00430.x
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References found in this work BETA

Critical Notice.Elizabeth Fricker - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):393 - 411.
Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?Elizabeth Fricker - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
Accepting Testimony.By Matthew Weiner - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256–264.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.
Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Andreas Stokke & Eliot Michaelson (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-112.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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