Testimonial justification: Inferential or non-inferential?

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95 (2006)
Abstract
Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. I show that her argument begs important questions. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00430.x
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References found in this work BETA
Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?Elizabeth Fricker - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
Accepting Testimony.By Matthew Weiner - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256–264.
Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):41-58.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.
Knowing at Second Hand.Benjamin McMyler - 2007 - Inquiry 50 (5):511 – 540.
Fricker on Testimonial Justification.Igor Douven & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):36-44.

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