Noûs 47 (3):177-196 (2013)

Authors
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Abstract
A chance-credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non-modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance-credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau's New Principle (NP); the second is Ismael's General Recipe (IP). Thus, the question arises: Should we adopt NP or IP or both? In this paper, I argue that IP has unacceptable consequences when coupled with reductionism, so we must accept NP alone
Keywords objective chance  Bayesianism  Principal Principle  reductionism  probability  undermining futures
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/nous.12047
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Volume 2.David Lewis - 1999 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Undermining and Admissibility.Michael Thau - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):491-504.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality.Derek Lam - forthcoming - In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.), Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge.
Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):439-463.
Correcting Credences with Chances.Ilho Park - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):509-536.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
On What We Know About Chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
Chance Without Credence.John T. Roberts - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):33-59.
Principled Chances.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):27-41.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-01-14

Total views
316 ( #34,472 of 2,533,631 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #260,743 of 2,533,631 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes