What is justified credence?

Authors
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Abstract
In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston, 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence comes in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn’s is a version of process reliabilism (Dunn, 2015) while Weng Hong Tang offers a version of indicator reliabilism (Tang, 2016). As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it is mysterious why we care about justification, for neither of the accounts explains how justification is connected to anything of epistemic value. We will call this the Connection Problem. I begin by describing Dunn’s process reliabilism and Tang’s indicator reliabilism. I argue that, understood correctly, they are, in fact, extensionally equivalent. That is, Dunn and Tang reach the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes. However, I argue that both face the Connection Problem. In response, I offer my own version of reliabilism, which is both process and indicator, and I argue that it solves that problem. Furthermore, I show that it is also extensionally equivalent to Dunn’s reliabilism and Tang’s. Thus, I reach the top of the same mountain as well. Having done that, I consider some objections to the account I propose and some consequences of it.
Keywords reliabilism  bayesian epistemology  justification  credences  veritism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Three Kinds of Reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
Reliabilism: Holistic or Simple?Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):225-233.
Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.
Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem.Umut Baysan - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45.
Reliabilism, Truth and Cognitive Science.James Robert Beebe - 2002 - Dissertation, Saint Louis University
The Diagonal and the Demon.Juan Comesaña - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
How to Be a Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-28

Total downloads
75 ( #83,329 of 2,267,048 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #11,603 of 2,267,048 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature