Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbers

Abstract
This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Brain  Epistemology  Mind  Cam, P  Searle, J
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_1992_3
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Searle's Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - unknown - Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
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