Journal of Business Ethics 9 (6):473-480 (1990)
Peter French has argued that conglomerate collectivities such as business corporations are moral persons and that aggregate collectivities such as lynch mobs are not. Two arguments are advanced to show that French's claim is flawed. First, the distinction between aggregates and conglomerates is, at best, a distinction of degree, not kind. Moreover, some aggregates show evidence of moral personhood. Second, French's criterion for distinguishing aggregates and conglomerates is based on inadequate grounds. Application of the criterion to specific cases requires an additional judgment of a pragmatic nature which undermines any attempt to demonstrate French's thesis that actual conglomerates are moral persons and aggregates are not. Thus, French's theory is seriously lacking both empirical basis and empirical relevance.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Collective and Corporate Responsibility.Peter A. French - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):117-119.
The Corporation as a Moral Person.Peter A. French - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):207 - 215.
Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do.Manuel G. Velasquez - 1983 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (3):1-18.
Individual and Corporate Responsibility.Jere Surber - 1983 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (4):67-88.
Citations of this work BETA
Focusing on Individuals' Ethical Judgement in Corporate Social Responsibility Curricula.Patrick Maclagan & Tim Campbell - 2011 - Business Ethics 20 (4):392-404.
Critical Events in the Ethics of U.S. Corporation History.S. Douglas Beets - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 102 (2):193-219.
Focusing on Individuals' Ethical Judgement in Corporate Social Responsibility Curricula.Patrick Maclagan & Tim Campbell - 2011 - Business Ethics: A European Review 20 (4):392-404.
Similar books and articles
Gimmicky Representations of Moral Theories.Peter Vallentyne - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (3-4):253-263.
The Failure of Theories of Personhood.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1999 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation).Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):193-208.
Collective Responsibility and the Practice of Medicine.Peter A. French - 1982 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7 (1):65-86.
Peter French, Corporate Ethics and the Wizard of Oz.Michael J. Kerlin - 1997 - Journal of Business Ethics 16 (12-13):1431-1438.
Corporations, Minors, and Other Innocents — a Reply to R. E. Ewin.P. Eddy Wilson - 1994 - Journal of Business Ethics 13 (10):761 - 774.
Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood.Rita C. Manning - 1984 - Journal of Business Ethics 3 (1):77 - 84.
Corporations as Intentional Systems.William G. Weaver - 1998 - Journal of Business Ethics 17 (1):87 - 97.
Dismemberment, Divorce and Hostile Takeovers: A Comment on Corporate Moral Personhood. [REVIEW]Rita C. Manning - 1988 - Journal of Business Ethics 7 (8):639 - 643.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #350,254 of 2,158,472 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #354,589 of 2,158,472 )
How can I increase my downloads?