The central distinction in the theory of corporate moral personhood

Journal of Business Ethics 9 (6):473-480 (1990)
Peter French has argued that conglomerate collectivities such as business corporations are moral persons and that aggregate collectivities such as lynch mobs are not. Two arguments are advanced to show that French's claim is flawed. First, the distinction between aggregates and conglomerates is, at best, a distinction of degree, not kind. Moreover, some aggregates show evidence of moral personhood. Second, French's criterion for distinguishing aggregates and conglomerates is based on inadequate grounds. Application of the criterion to specific cases requires an additional judgment of a pragmatic nature which undermines any attempt to demonstrate French's thesis that actual conglomerates are moral persons and aggregates are not. Thus, French's theory is seriously lacking both empirical basis and empirical relevance.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00382840
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References found in this work BETA
Collective and Corporate Responsibility.Peter A. French - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):117-119.
The Corporation as a Moral Person.Peter A. French - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):207 - 215.
Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do.Manuel G. Velasquez - 1983 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (3):1-18.
Individual and Corporate Responsibility.Jere Surber - 1983 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (4):67-88.

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Critical Events in the Ethics of U.S. Corporation History.S. Douglas Beets - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 102 (2):193-219.

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