Authors
Christoph C. Pfisterer
University of Zürich
Abstract
The paper examines Davidson′s discussion of Frege on the problem of predication. Simple declarative sentences are unities that are true or false; how do predicates contribute to this kind of semantic unity? According to Davidson, the problem cannot be solved by assigning referents to predicates, since this leads to an infinite regress. Frege famously contributes the idea that predicates are “incomplete” or “unsaturated” functional expressions, mapping objects to truth-values. However, he takes predicates to refer to concepts and thus is exposed to Davidson′s argument. I will show that Davidson is only right with regards to “Frege′s semantics”. Yet Frege′s logical doctrine of the decomposition of a sentence – I shall argue – allows for a resolution of this problem
Keywords Davidson, Frege, Unit  Frege  Unity of the proposition  predication
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DOI 10.1524/dzph.2009.0049
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
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Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.James Cargile - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (2):320-323.
Philosophy of Logic.W. Quine - 1970 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.

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