Looking to systems theory for a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience and evolutionary foundations for H.O.T

Abstract
This paper details an evolving dynamic systems hierarchy and explores its relationship with conceptual, evolutionary, physiological, and behavioural characteristics that include phenomenal experience. In doing this, the paper demonstrates an example of a type-C physicalist's reductive explanation of phenomenal experience that is coherent with stipulated philosophical criteria and theories. By providing a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, the paper provides insights toward explaining many unique human characteristics. These include, creativity, the origins of language as distinct from animal communication, the evolution of morality, and the dynamics behind bias and prejudice. Furthermore, the reductive explanation provides foundations for artificial consciousness applications.
Keywords
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,719
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
Consciousness, Qualia, and Re-Entrant Signaling.Natika Newton - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):21-41.
Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 61-85.
Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive Explanation.Raphael van Riel - 2010 - Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):183-219.
An Argument for Nonreductive Representationalism.Richard Gray - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):365-376.
Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
Intentionalism and Change Blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
Reductive Explanation and the "Explanatory Gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
67 ( #81,305 of 2,197,266 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #298,963 of 2,197,266 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature