The folk strike back; or, why you didn't do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it

Philosophical Studies 138 (2):291 - 298 (2008)
Abstract
Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain
Keywords Experimental philosophy  Action theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9047-y
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References found in this work BETA
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):196-213.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.
Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

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Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
Folk Psychology: Science and Morals.Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer Press.
Unintentionally Biasing the Data: Reply to Knobe.Roblin R. Meeks - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):220-223.
Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
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2009-01-28

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