Metaphysica 8 (2):203-209 (2007)
AbstractPeter van Inwagen attempts to demonstrate the apparent incompatibility of free will and indeterminism through an imaginative thought experiment. He imagines God repeatedly rolling the world back to its state one minute prior to the performance of an undetermined, putatively free action and then letting it go forward again. Van Inwagen argues that the outcome most friendly to the supposition that the agent acted freely, in which she does otherwise about half the time, is one which apparently shows that her original act was a matter of chance, and thus not free. I argue that neither this outcome nor any other implies that her action was not free
Similar books and articles
Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen.Meghan Elizabeth Griffith - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.
Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - In John Hyman & Helen Steward (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-241.
Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (1):31-40.
Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views.Timothy O’Connor - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-26.
Is There a Modal Fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'?J. Westphal - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):36-41.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.