Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing

Authors
Ian Phillips
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Block () highlights two experimental studies of neglect patients which, he contends, provide ‘dramatic evidence’ for unconscious seeing. In Block's hands this is the highly non-trivial thesis that seeing of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur outside of phenomenal consciousness. Block's case for it provides an excellent opportunity to consider a large body of research on clinical syndromes widely held to evidence unconscious perception. I begin by considering in detail the two studies of neglect to which Block appeals. I show why their interpretation as evidence of unconscious seeing faces a series of local difficulties. I then explain how, even bracketing these issues, a long-standing but overlooked problem concerning our criterion for consciousness problematizes the appeal to both studies. I explain why this problem is especially pressing for Block given his view that phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness. I further show that it is epidemic—not only affecting all report-based studies of unconscious seeing in neglect, but also analogous studies of the condition most often alleged to show unconscious seeing, namely blindsight.
Keywords Consciousness  Perception  Unconscious perception  Blindsight  Neglect  Signal Detection Theory  Phenomenal Consciousness  Access Consciousness  Ned Block
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12224
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

View all 78 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.
The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism About Unconscious Perception.Ned Block - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):452-459.
Biased by Our Imaginings.Ema Sullivan‐Bissett - forthcoming - Mind and Language.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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