Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2377-2396 (2016)

Ben Phillips
Arizona State University
When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing that earn their explanatory keep in both vision science and the philosophy of perception are context-sensitive as well.
Keywords Object-seeing  Contextualism  Seeing-ascriptions  Multiple-object tracking  Perceptual demonstrative thought
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0619-6
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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