Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition

Phenomenology and Mind (10):140-155 (2016)

Philip Woodward
Valparaiso University
Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters that serve as phenomenal modes of presentations of particulars. In imagination, somatosensory properties are replaced with phenomenal-intentional properties whose intentional objects are somatosensory properties, thus resulting in imaginative facsimiles of perceptual P-I property clusters. Such structures can then be used as phenomenal prototypes that pick out individuals and kinds. Sets of such prototypes constitute a subject’s conception of individuals and kinds. Combined with a few additional elements, these imaginative P-I property clusters serve as the building-blocks of conscious cognitive states. Different ways of carving up theoretical space classify my theory either as inflationary or as non-inflationary. I conclude that the theory is anti-inflationary in letter but inflationary in spirit.
Keywords Cognitive Phenomenology  Phenomenal Intentionality  Phenomenal Properties  Intentional Properties
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Intentionality: Reductionism Vs. Primitivism.Philip Woodward - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-22.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought?Peter V. Forrest - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):403-424.
The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience.Jennifer Matey - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (3).
Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience.Jennifer Matey - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):241-254.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Against Qualia Theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.


Added to PP index

Total views
136 ( #51,444 of 2,235,936 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #19,495 of 2,235,936 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature