Analysis 74 (3):379-382 (2014)

Ian Phillips
Johns Hopkins University
Sainsbury argues that the nineteenth century case of Maurice v. Judd, in which the jury apparently ruled that whales are fish, presents a paradox whose ‘resolution will require carefully formulated metasemantic principles’ (2014: 5). I argue that Sainsbury misconstrues what is fundamentally at issue in the court room. The substantive disagreement (and so verdict) does not concern whether whales are fish but rather the intended meaning of the phrase ‘fish oil’ as employed in a statute authorizing the appointment of ‘fish oil’ inspectors. So conceived, Maurice v. Judd contains no paradox
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anu052
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Fishy Business.Mark Sainsbury - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):3-5.

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