Indiscriminability and experience of change

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):808 - 827 (2011)
It is obvious both that some changes are too small for us to perceive and that we can perceive constant motion. Yet according to Fara, these two facts are in conflict, and one must be rejected. I show that conflict arises only from accepting a `zoëtrope conception' of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content. On pain of denying the phenomenologically obvious, we must reject the zoëtrope conception. I offer an alternative account, according to which the dynamic content of our experience at short timescales is metaphysically dependent on the content of experience over longer timescales. Moreover, at short timescales such content is purely determinable
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Jiri Benovsky (2015). Dual‐Aspect Monism. Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):335-352.
Valtteri Arstila (2016). Theories of Apparent Motion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):337-358.
Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.

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