Meaning-scepticism and analyticity

Dialectica 59 (3):357–365 (2005)
In his paper "Analyticity", Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that nonfactualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning -- and this shows that Quine's argument can't be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a _reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted _reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine's argument, properly interpreted, has a more limited scope than is generally believed and that it leaves the door open to non-Platonistic account of meaning
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01020.x
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W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.

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