Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl

Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435 (2017)

Authors
Philip Walsh
Fordham University
Abstract
This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl’s concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation designates the unique phenomenal character of this structure as it is experientially lived through. The way experience hangs together is itself a phenomenal feature of experience.
Keywords Husserl  phenomenal intentionality  horizon  motivation  phenomenology  intentionality
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-09403007
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References found in this work BETA

The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemic Import of Affectivity: A Husserlian Account.Jacob Martin Rump - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):82-104.
Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.
Visual Field and Empty Space.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy (published online):403-411.
Distant Things: A Closer Look.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (Published Online):249-263.

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