Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435 (2017)

Authors
Philip Walsh
Fordham University
Abstract
This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl’s concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation designates the unique phenomenal character of this structure as it is experientially lived through. The way experience hangs together is itself a phenomenal feature of experience.
Keywords Husserl  phenomenal intentionality  horizon  motivation  phenomenology  intentionality
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1163/18756735-09403007
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References found in this work BETA

Cartesian Meditations.Edmund Husserl - 1960 - [The Hague]M. Nijhoff.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemic Import of Affectivity: A Husserlian Account.Jacob Martin Rump - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):82-104.
Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.
Visual Field and Empty Space.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy (published online):403-411.

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